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PROBATE AND ESTATE LAW
Things have a terrible permanence when people die.-ALNL
KILMER, Things.
STATUTORY CHANGES IN ILLINOIS PROBATE LAW-
1950-1960
MARSHALL T. ISMONI)THE DECADE OF the 1950's produced many statutory changes in
Illinois in the probate field, both in substantive rights and in
practices and procedures. Well over fifty changes were made in
five general legislative sessions-the majority in the Probate Act itself.
This article undertakes to cover only the more significant principles of
the major new provisions.
HISTORY OF THE CHANGES-A "DISTILLING PROCESS"
It is appropriate to describe, briefly, the circumstances under which
the changes were accomplished. They originated largely in probate
committees of the Chicago and Illinois State Bar Associations, where
they were first proposed, extensively studied, and drafted into bills for
presentation to the Legislature. Frequently proposals were reviewed
by several other committees in the associations. In almost all instances
both associations collaborated. All bills originating elsewhere, but
touching this field, were scrutinized by the appropriate committees of
the two associations. It was a sort of distilling process whereby the
experiences of practicing lawyers were translated into new concepts
and procedures, albeit slowly.
Footnotes herein as to the various statutory amendments and new
sections do not contain references to the ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES,
but are limited to the appropriate Senate or House bill numbers and
the year of passage. This will permit the bills to be examined in their
entirety by those interested in doing so. The latter method of citation
makes for simplicity and accuracy, particularly as to those bills which
cover numerous sections. Those who would like to inquire further will
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find helpful discussions in the 1960 pocket parts of JAMES, ILLINOIS
PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE, currently edited by Mr. Austin Fleming,
under notes keyed to the numbers of the sections discussed herein.
A TEN-YEAR REVIEW OF PROBATE AND ESTATE LAW AMENDMENTS
For many years lawyers occasionally found themselves unable to
distribute in intestate estates where the heirs had to be traced through
grandparents or more remote ancestors under rule Sixth of the Rules
of Descent (section 11 of the Probate Act). The rule, prior to the
1959 amendment, made it necessary to ascertain all of the "nearest
kindred" through both the paternal and maternal sides. Frequently a
portion or all of the heirs on one side were unknown, although those
on the other were fully known. It sometimes was impossible to deter-
mine the number of persons of equal degree as to both sides or, where
little or nothing was known about one side of a family, whether that
side would produce an heir of higher degree than those established on
the other. In such cases any distribution was impossible.
The 1959 amendment to section 11 of the Probate Act,' effective as
to persons dying on or after July 8, 1959, inserts two new rules Sixth
and Seventh to correct the difficulty mentioned in the preceding para-
graph. Where the heirship must be traced through grandparents, the
new rule Sixth provides that half the estate passes to the maternal
grandparents in equal parts, or to the survivor of them, and if neither
is living, to their descendants, per stirpes. The other half passes to the
paternal grandparents, or to their descendants, in like manner. If there
is no one to take on one side, then the other side takes all. Where heir-
ship must be traced through great-grandparents, the new rule Seventh
provides for the same type of division. Thus, the amendment attempts
to reduce the number of instances in which distribution will be com-
pletely frustrated. However, whether this will be accomplished, and
whether other distribution complications will result, remains to be
seen.
Under the new rules, experience may prove that it will be necessary
to establish the identity of remote kindred more frequently than in the
past. This increase in the number of heirs is bound to raise some new
problems. Only time will tell whether frustrated distributions will
1 S.B. 75 (1959). As noted in the third paragraph of this article, the reference to the
statutory change in this footnote and in succeeding footnotes is to the bill introduced
in the appropriate house (Senate or House of Representatives) and the year of pas-
sage by the Illinois Legislature.
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occur more frequently under the new rules than under the old. While
there may be fewer situations where total failure of distribution
occurs, there may be more undistributable half portions of estates
which would have gone to nearest kindred on the other side of the
family under the old rule.
Adopted children were raised more completely to the status of nat-
ural children for purposes of receiving property by inheritance, will,
and otherwise by amendments to section 14, in 1953 and 1955. The
1953 amendment' made such a child a descendant of the adopting
parent capable of inheriting both from the adopting parent and from
the lineal and collateral kindred of the adopting parent. It also gave the
adopting parent the status of a natural parent for the purposes of in-
heritance, except that the natural family will take from the child such
property as the child has taken from the natural family. For the pur-
pose of determining property rights under any instrument executed
after January 1, 1954, an adopted child is deemed a natural child unless
the contrary intention appears in the instrument. Technical improve-
ments were provided by the 1955 changes.3
The inheritance problems which arise out of an adoption situation
can be very complex where the child is not a stranger to both of the
adopting parents. In many instances, divorce and remarriage have pre-
ceded the adoption, with one, or both, of the new spouses adopting the
children of the other. In other cases, the death of parents or other mis-
fortune frequently results in a child being adopted by an aunt, uncle,
or other relative. In such cases, shall an adopted child lose his right to
inherit from or through a natural parent because of the divorce or
other misfortune which destroyed the innocent child's family? (For a
detailed discussion of these changes and problems, reference is made to
JAMES (mentioned in the early portion of this article)).
The 1959 Legislature adopted a new act 4 relating to adoptions which
has probate implications. As of January 1, 1960, an adult person in this
State may be adopted, provided the conditions prescribed by the act
are met.
A new section, 16a, was added to the Probate Act in 1955,5 provid-
ing that upon a renunciation of a will by a surviving spouse, a future
interest which is to take effect upon the termination of the interest
given the spouse shall accelerate and take effect as though the surviv-
2 S.B. 132 (1953). 4 S. B. 737 (1959).
8 S.B. 155, S.B. 156 (1955). 5 H.B. 23 (1955).
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ing spouse has predeceased the testator. The marital deduction has
resulted in an increased number of renunciations and consequential
difficulties. This much-needed new section fills a serious void in Illi-
nois statutory and case law.
One of the most important tools of modem estate planning was
given a statutory foundation in 1955 by the addition of section 43a to
the Probate Act." The tool is the so called "pour-over" will, which
gives property to an inter vivos revocable trust. Although for some
years this device had become more and more frequently employed, in
the absence of an appropriate statute its legality was insecure under
the decisions. This new section, which took effect July 1, 1955, pro-
vides that "a testator may devise and bequeath real and personal
estate to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written instrument
in existence when the will is made and which is identified in the will,
even though the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revoca-
tion, or termination." An excellent discussion of the problems related
to the substance of this new section is contained in JAMES.
Limitations on the qualifications of witnesses to wills were realisti-
cally liberalized by an amendment to section 44 of the Probate Act in
1957,7 effective as to wills of decedents dying after July 1, 1957. It
provides:
No individual or corporation is disqualified to act or to receive compensa-
tion for acting in any fiduciary capacity with respect to a will of a decedent
by reason of the fact that any employee or partner of such individual or any
employee or shareholder of such corporation attests the execution of the will
or testifies thereto. No attorney or partnership of attorneys is disqualified to
act or to receive compensation for acting as attorney for any fiduciary by
reason of the fact that such attorney or any employee or partner of such at-
torney or partnership attests the execution of the will or testifies thereto.
Probably the majority of wills are executed in the offices of the
testator's attorneys, who frequently are the only conveniently avail-
able or practicable witnesses. Certain decisions, particularly In re
Georges Estate,s cast serious doubt upon the qualification of such
attorneys to be compensated for services rendered in the administra-
tion of such a will, even though the testator expressed in his will the
desire that such attorney act. This amendment is a substantial clarifica-
tion of the law in this particular.
Two particularly important changes were effected by the 1957
amendment to section 46 of the Probate Ace? effective July 1, 1957,
6 H.B. 100 (1955). 8 11 Ili. App.2d 359, 137 N.E.2d 555 (1956).
7 H.B. 145 (1957). 9 S.B. 54 (1957).
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relating to the revocation of wills. The first change relates to the effec-
tiveness of the revocation of a will by a later will declaring the revoca-
tion. In Stetson v. Stetson,10 the Supreme Court declared that where a
testator executed a later will expressly declaring that all prior wills be
revoked, such prior wills would be revived upon the destruction of
such revoking will. This rule, of course, did not apply to prior wills
which were physically destroyed. The section now provides: "No
will which is in any manner revoked shall be revived otherwise than
by the re-execution thereof, or by an instrument in writing declaring
the revival and signed and attested in the manner prescribed by this
Article for the signing and attestation of a will."
The other change made by the amendment to section 46 relates to
the effect of divorce upon a will. Prior to such amendment, divorce or
annulment resulted in no revocation. Now, "unless the will expressly
provides to the contrary: (1) . . . ; and (2) the divorce or annul-
ment of the marriage of the testator revokes every beneficial devise,
legacy or interest given to the testator's former spouse in a will
executed before the entry of the decree of divorce or annulment, and
the will shall take effect in the same manner as if the former spouse
died before the testator."
Extremely important changes were made in 1955 and 1957 in sec-
tion 49 of the Probate Act, which deals with the disposition of devises
or legacies to deceased devisees or legatees. The changes eliminate
many intestate situations which frequently did violence to the testa-
tor's intentions. The 1955 amendment," which retained the former
provision to the effect that the descendants of a legatee or devisee
shall take, per stirpes, his share where he predeceases the testator, pro-
viding he (the devisee or legatee) was a descendant of the testator and
the will made no provision for such contingency, is as follows:
[W]hen a devise or legacy lapses by reason of the death of the devisee or
legatee before the testator, and there is no provision in the will for that con-
tingency, the estate so devised or bequeathed shall be included in and pass as
part of the residue under the will, and if the devise or legacy is or becomes
part of the residue, the estate so devised or bequeathed shall pass to and be
taken by the legatees or devisees, or those remaining, if any, of the residue in
proportions and upon estates corresponding to their respective interests in the
residue.
The 1957 amendment to section 4912 provides:
10 200 I1. 601,66 N.E. 262 (1903), Annot., 61 L.R.A. 258 (1903).
U H.B. 71 (1955). 12 S.B. 242 (1957).
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When a devise or legacy is to a class and any member of the class dies be-
fore the testator and there is no provision in the will for that contingency, the
members of the class who survive the testator take the share or shares which
the deceased member would have taken had he survived the testator, except
that if the deceased member of the class is a descendant of the testator, the
descendants of the deceased member take per stirpes the share or shares which
the deceased member would have taken had he survived the testator.
The exception, of course, retains the principle regarding descendants
which was part of the prior law. An excellent commentary on the de-
tails of these changes is to be found in JAMES.
A new tool for probate practitioners and testators was created in
1957 by the addition of section 89b to the Probate Act.13 It permits
a non-resident decedent to provide "in his will that the testamentary
disposition of tangible or intangible personal estate, having a situs
within . . . [Illinois] as defined in Section 55, shall be construed and
regulated by the laws of this State, [and that] the validity and effect
of such dispositions shall be determined by such laws. In respect of
such testamentary dispositions of tangible or intangible personal estate
the probate court, in its discretion, may direct and, in the case of a
decedent who was at the time of his death a resident of a foreign
country, shall direct the executor or administrator appointed in this
State to make distribution directly to those designated by the de-
cedent's will as beneficiaries of such tangible or intangible personal
estate."
It is rare that a change in anything as technical as the Probate Act is
a matter of public interest, but in 1959, after approximately forty
years of effort in many legislative sessions during that period, and un-
der the pressure of great publicity, section 9614 was amended to permit
a non-resident heir to nominate a resident administrator of a decedent's
estate. Formerly, when an Illinois resident died intestate, or without
naming a qualified executor, and there were no resident heirs, only the
Public Administrator was permitted to administer the estate. Non-
residents, regardless of their personal interest or qualifications, were
not permitted to select, or even advise in the selection of, an adminis-
trator. The plucking of this political plum was lamented only in cer-
tain centers of self-interest which shall be nameless. This amendment
becomes effective December 4, 1961, so that, as to persons dying there-
after, a non-resident heir may select and nominate an Illinois adminis-
trator of his choice.
13 H..103 (1955). 14 H.B. 18 (1959).
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A new office, "Conservator to Collect," was created by the addi-
tion, in 1957, of section 113a to the Probate Act.15 The position is
similar to the office of Administrator to Collect, and is intended to
serve substantially the same purpose. It has been found that there are
occasions where, pending the hearing on a petition for appointment of
a conservator, there is a need for the interim protection or manage-
ment of the respondent's business, farm, or other assets. Heretofore,
such has not been possible. This addition will serve to correct the defi-
ciency.
During this ten-year period, many beneficial changes were made
regarding the management of estates. Broad new powers were granted
conservators and guardians for leasing oil, gas, coal and other minerals
in a new section 222a to the Probate Act which was added in 1955.16
An amendment to section 246 of the Probate Act in 195517 clarified the
power of an executor to sell or mortgage real estate under a power in
the will, regardless of whether the will subsequently was set aside.
Modernized investment powers added by the 195518 and 1957's amend-
ments to section 259 had perhaps the most important impact on the
affairs of incompetents and minors. Prior thereto, such persons had
little or no opportunity to enjoy economic growth or protection against
the ravages of inflation. These amendments permit a portion of the
ward's assets to be invested in equities, subject to the strict and rather
complex limitations prescribed in the section. It is recommended that
the extensive commentary in JAMES covering these amendments be
read carefully.
To lawyers, perhaps the most controversial change made in the Pro-
bate Act relates to the amendments affecting appeals from the Probate
Court. In the past, except in specified instances, all appeals have been
from the Probate Court to the Circuit Court, where the matters would
be tried de novo. As a consequence, trials in the Probate Court fre-
quently were little more than harassing or preliminary investigations
which resulted in a multiplicity of hearings.
Many lawyers feel that all appeals should be direct to the Appellate
Court and that all trials de novo in the Circuit Court should be abol-
ished. Another large group of lawyers believes, just as strongly, that
the Probate Court is essentially an administrative court in a large part
15 S.B. 69 (1957).
16 S.B. 516 (1955). 18 S.B. 20 (1955).
17 H.B. 1092 (1955). 19 H.B. 6 (1957).
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of its function, and that the old procedures permitted the disposition
of many small matters more or less informally.
The appeals sections of the Probate Act were amended in 1959,20
without the sponsorship of the bar associations, as a result of which,
appeals were divided into two categories: Appeals from orders admit-
ting or refusing to admit wills to probate, proceedings in the sale of
real estate, and orders where the amount in controversy was $3,090.00
or more, would be taken to the Appellate or Supreme Court; all other
appeals would be taken to the Circuit Court, where the matter would
be tried de novo. Unfortunately, the 1959 amendment is considered
to be vague and uncertain as to what constitutes an amount in con-
troversy of $3,000.00. Both associations are officially agreed that the
1959 amendment must be clarified in this respect, and a new amend-
ment has been drafted, and will be sponsored for passage in 1961.
The 1959 amendment2' to section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Act,
provides that in cases of contingent testamentary dispositions, the tax
will be assessed upon the happening of the most probable of the con-
tingencies. Formerly, the tax was required to be assessed and paid on
that contingency which would produce the greatest tax, regardless of
how improbable such contingency might be; and whenever, and as
often as, an event occurred which would produce a lower tax, the
party entitled thereto could apply to the county court for a reassess-
ment of the tax and to the state treasurer for a refund of the overpay-
ment. With luck the state treasurer had sufficient funds on hand to
repay. Frequently there were no funds on hand for the purpose, and
then it would be necessary to await an appropriation by the next ses-
sion of the Legislature. No interest was paid on the money so refund-
able. In 1945, attempt was made to alleviate the losses resulting from
such excess tax payments through a tentative tax device which pro-
vided for a deposit of government bonds with the state treasurer.
This method, however, proved to be cumbersome and generally un-
satisfactory. The 1959 change will prove to be a truly helpful amend-
ment.
Most important amendments22 to sections 10 to 14, inclusive, of the
Statute of Frauds and Perjuries were made in 1955, effective July 1,
1955, respecting the situation where the personal estate of the decedent
is insufficient for the payment of his debts. Formerly in such a situa-
20 H.B 534 (1959).
21 S.B. 88 (1959). 22 S.B. 126, S.B. 127 (1955).
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tion, apparently the only limitation upon the creditor's right to main-
tain an action against lands taken by an heir or devisee was the running
of the general statute of limitations against the obligation of the de-
cedent sought to be enforced. The courts have held that failure to file
a claim against the decedent's estate within the statutory period
allowed for the filing of claims did not preclude the creditor from
maintaining an action against the heir or devisees under the Statute of
Frauds and Perjuries. Before the statutory changes, a note, for exam-
ple, could have been enforced against the decedent's heir or devisee
until the running of the ten-year statute had barred an action on the
note. Now, under this amendment, where the personal estate of a dece-
dent is insufficient for the payment of debts, a creditor must proceed
against the heirs or devisees within seven years from the date of the
decedent's death unless Letters Testamentary or of Administration
are applied for within such seven-year period; in the latter event, the
creditor must file his claim within the period for filing claims under
the Probate Act, normally nine months from the date of issuance of
letters.
In the aforesaid amendments to sections 10 to 14 there is also found
a new specific limitation on suits to enforce a contract to make a will.
Formerly, the only limitations applicable to such suits have been the
general statutes of limitation relating to actions on contracts. Now
such actions shall be commenced within two years after the date of
death, unless Letters Testamentary or of Administration are applied for
within two years of such date, in which event such actions shall be
commenced within and not after the time for presenting claims against
estates of deceased persons in accordance with the Probate Act.
A 1955 amendment23 to sections 5 and 14 of the Principal and In-
come Act, has an important bearing on the treatment of income dur-
ing the administration of the estate of a testator. It provides for the
distribution of income earned or accrued during the period of adminis-
tration, and not payable to others; such amounts are to be distributed
as income among the trustees of any pecuniary legacies in trust or
trustees of any trusts in proportion to their respective interests com-
puted in the manner specified. The amendment also includes a defini-
tion of what is "income" for purposes of distribution, supplying a
much needed standard.
The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act24 became law in Illinois on July
23 H.B. 37 (1959). 24 H.B. 233 (1959).
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2, 1959. This is a new and as yet a relatively untried device which
seeks to simplify the making of gifts to children without the use of a
trust or legal guardianship. The act permits a donor to give property
to a custodian to hold pursuant to the provisions of the act for the
benefit of the minor, and to deliver the property to the minor upon the
latter's attaining age twenty-one. The tax implications are largely un-
known. Many members of the Bar strongly opposed this legislation on
the grounds that it may create more problems than it can solve, includ-
ing among their objections the uncertainties as to tax consequences,
the consequences of reckless or ill-informed use of the statute, and
also the probability of excessive tax-saving motivation, which too fre-
quently produces undesirable results.
In 1951, the sections relating to dower were amended. 5 Prior to
these amendments, a surviving spouse first became vested with a dower
interest which would be lost (resulting in a fee being taken in lieu
thereof) through the failure to file an election to take (perfect)
dower. Under the amendments, the surviving spouse now takes a fee
interest which is divested by electing to take dower in the manner pre-
scribed by the act. The new amendments also provide that dower is
lost unless elected, even in the case of real estate which was conveyed
by the deceased spouse during the marriage without a release of dower
by the surviving spouse at the time of conveyance.
To mention a few other changes: Small estates limitations have been
raised; the Rule in Shelley's Case 26 and the Worthier Title Doctrine 27
have been abolished; and the rights of personal representatives to join
in the execution of joint income tax returns of decedents and wards
have been made practical by the elimination of personal responsibility
for the tax, absent fraud on the part of the representative.
As readily can be seen, the past decade truly has produced many
advancements in the area of statutory probate law.
25 H.B. 975 (1951).
20 H.B. 402 (1953). 27 H.B. 69 (1955).
